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In	  the	  modern	  regulatory	  state,	  there	  is	  a	  serious	  tension	  between	  two	  
indispensable	  ideas.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  measure,	  both	  in	  advance	  
and	  on	  a	  continuing	  basis,	  the	  effects	  of	  regulation	  on	  social	  welfare,	  usually	  
through	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis.	  The	  second	  idea,	  attributable	  above	  all	  to	  
Friedrich	  Hayek,	  is	  that	  knowledge	  is	  widely	  dispersed	  in	  society.	  As	  Hayek	  and	  
his	  followers	  emphasize,	  governments	  planners	  cannot	  possibly	  know	  what	  
individuals	  know,	  simply	  because	  they	  lack	  that	  dispersed	  knowledge.	  When	  
important	  information	  is	  missing,	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  can	  be	  exceptionally	  
difficult	  to	  conduct.	  There	  are	  three	  ways	  to	  respond	  to	  that	  problem.	  The	  first	  
involves	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  rulemaking,	  which	  has	  particular	  promise	  in	  the	  
modern	  era,	  where	  regulators	  are	  in	  a	  far	  better	  position	  to	  collect	  the	  
dispersed	  information	  of	  the	  public.	  The	  second	  involves	  retrospective	  analysis,	  
accompanied	  by	  a	  process	  for	  obtaining	  public	  comment.	  In	  many	  cases,	  
retrospective	  analysis	  has	  found	  that	  the	  ex	  ante	  estimates	  were	  wrong,	  thus	  
pointing	  the	  way	  toward	  potential	  improvements	  both	  in	  rules	  and	  in	  future	  
estimates.	  The	  third,	  and	  potentially	  the	  most	  valuable,	  involves	  experiments,	  
above	  all	  randomized	  controlled	  trials,	  which	  can	  give	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  
the	  likely	  effects	  of	  regulations.	  
	  	  
I.	  Two	  Indispensable	  Ideas	  	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  past	  and	  future	  of	  regulation,	  there	  are	  two	  truly	  indispensable	  ideas.	  Unfortunately,	  they	  are	  in	  serious	  tension	  with	  one	  another.	  Potential	  solutions	  lie	  in	  three	  reforms,	  all	  connected	  with	  democracy	  itself	  –	  but	  perhaps	  not	  quite	  in	  the	  way	  that	  most	  people	  think.	  	  	   The	  first	  indispensable	  idea	  is	  that	  it	  is	  immensely	  important	  to	  measure,	  both	  in	  advance	  and	  on	  a	  continuing	  basis,	  the	  effects	  of	  regulation	  of	  social	  welfare.	  As	  an	  empirical	  matter,	  what	  are	  the	  human	  consequences	  of	  regulatory	  requirements?	  That	  is	  the	  right	  question	  to	  ask,	  but	  inside	  and	  outside	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  Robert	  Walmsley	  University	  Professor,	  Harvard	  University.	  This	  essay	  is	  a	  revised	  and	  greatly	  expanded	  version	  of	  Democratizing	  Regulation,	  Digitally,	  which	  appeared	  in	  Democracy:	  A	  Journal	  of	  Ideas	  (2014).	  Many	  thanks	  to	  the	  editors	  for	  permission	  to	  build	  on	  that	  essay	  here.	  Special	  thanks	  to	  Tyler	  Cowen	  and	  Adrian	  Vermeule	  for	  valuable	  comments	  on	  a	  previous	  draft.	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government,	  it	  is	  tempting	  to	  focus	  on	  other	  things.	  These	  include	  the	  opinions	  of	  relevant	  officials	  and	  interests	  (“what	  does	  the	  business	  community	  think?”	  or	  “do	  environmentalists	  feel	  strongly?”),	  or	  purely	  symbolic	  or	  expressive	  considerations,	  as	  in	  the	  unhelpful	  and	  potentially	  damaging	  view	  that	  more	  stringent	  environmental	  regulation,	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  minimum	  wage,	  or	  strengthened	  protection	  of	  occupational	  safety	  is	  desirable	  because	  “it	  makes	  a	  statement.”	  	  	   At	  the	  present	  time,	  the	  right	  way	  to	  answer	  the	  right	  question	  is	  to	  try	  to	  identify	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  regulations,	  in	  order	  to	  catalogue	  and	  to	  compare	  the	  various	  consequences,	  and	  to	  help	  make	  sensible	  tradeoffs.	  To	  be	  sure,	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  can	  create	  serious	  challenges,	  and	  at	  the	  present	  time,	  it	  is	  hardly	  a	  perfect	  tool.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  is	  the	  best	  one	  we	  now	  have.1	  Some	  people	  do	  not	  love	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis,	  but	  they	  should.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  know	  about	  the	  real-­‐world	  effects	  of	  regulation,	  that	  form	  of	  analysis	  deserves	  a	  lot	  of	  love.	  	  	   The	  second	  idea,	  attributable	  above	  all	  to	  Friedrich	  Hayek,	  is	  that	  knowledge	  is	  widely	  dispersed	  in	  society.2	  As	  Hayek	  and	  his	  followers	  emphasize,	  governments	  planners	  cannot	  possibly	  know	  what	  individuals	  know,	  simply	  because	  they	  lack	  that	  dispersed	  knowledge.	  The	  multiple	  failures	  of	  plans,	  and	  the	  omnipresence	  of	  unintended	  consequences,	  can	  be	  attributed,	  in	  large	  part,	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  relevant	  information.3	  Hayek	  was	  particularly	  concerned	  about	  socialist-­‐style	  planning.	  He	  contended	  that	  even	  ifs	  socialist	  planners	  are	  well-­‐motivated	  and	  if	  the	  public	  interest	  is	  their	  true	  concern,	  they	  will	  fail,	  because	  they	  will	  not	  know	  enough	  to	  succeed.	  Hayek	  celebrated	  the	  price	  system	  as	  a	  “marvel,”	  not	  for	  any	  mystical	  reason,	  but	  because	  it	  can	  aggregate	  dispersed	  information,	  and	  do	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  permits	  rapid	  adjustment	  to	  changing	  circumstances,	  values,	  and	  tastes.	  	  	   Hayek’s	  concern	  offers	  a	  serious	  cautionary	  note	  for	  planners	  of	  all	  kinds,	  including	  contemporary	  regulators	  who	  are	  committed,	  at	  least	  as	  a	  general	  rule,	  to	  free	  markets	  and	  freedom	  of	  contract.	  Even	  if	  they	  despise	  socialism	  and	  are	  simply	  correcting	  market	  failures	  (as,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  domains	  of	  pollution,	  health	  care,	  or	  occupational	  safety),	  they	  might	  well	  lack	  indispensable	  information.	  Suppose	  that	  they	  are	  seeking	  to	  reduce	  levels	  of	  particulate	  matter	  in	  the	  ambient	  air.	  What,	  precisely,	  are	  the	  health	  benefits	  of	  a	  reduction	  of	  existing	  levels	  to	  12	  parts	  per	  billion	  (ppb),	  or	  11	  ppb,	  or	  8	  ppb4?	  And	  what	  would	  be	  the	  costs,	  economic	  and	  otherwise,	  of	  mandating	  such	  reductions?	  When	  should	  reductions	  be	  required?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  Cass	  R.	  Sunstein,	  Valuing	  Life:	  Humanizing	  the	  Regulatory	  State	  (2014).	  For	  criticism	  and	  an	  interesting	  alternative,	  see	  John	  Bronsteen	  et	  al.,	  Happiness	  and	  the	  Law	  (forthcoming	  2014).	  2	  See	  Friedrich	  Hayek,	  The	  Uses	  of	  Knowledge	  in	  Society,	  35	  Am.	  Econ.	  Rev.	  519	  	  (1945).	  3	  See	  Dietrich	  Dorner,	  The	  Logic	  of	  Failure	  (1996)	  4	  On	  some	  of	  the	  challenges	  here,	  see	  Francesca	  Dominici	  et	  al.,	  Particulate	  Matter	  Matters,	  244	  Science	  257	  (2014).	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How	  should	  they	  be	  obtained?	  Should	  small	  businesses	  receive	  exemptions?	  Of	  what	  kinds?	  What	  are	  the	  alternative	  approaches,	  and	  of	  these,	  which	  is	  best?	  	  The	  problem	  should	  not	  be	  overstated.	  With	  respect	  to	  costs,	  regulators	  often	  have	  a	  good	  sense	  of	  potential	  outcomes,	  in	  part	  because	  of	  information	  from	  the	  regulated	  sector.	  To	  be	  sure,	  that	  information	  might	  well	  be	  self-­‐serving,	  but	  regulators	  often	  have	  sufficient	  experience	  to	  discount	  alarmist	  or	  excessive	  claims.	  With	  respect	  to	  benefits,	  quantification	  and	  monetization	  present	  separate	  issues.	  In	  many	  domains,	  existing	  knowledge	  is	  sufficient	  to	  permit	  the	  identification	  of	  sufficiently	  narrow	  ranges	  with	  respect	  to	  (say)	  mortalities	  averted	  or	  accidents	  prevented.5	  Well-­‐established	  (and	  continuously	  improving)	  tools	  are	  in	  place	  to	  convert	  various	  values	  into	  monetary	  equivalents.6	  In	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  life	  of	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis,	  regulators	  are	  hardly	  making	  a	  stab	  in	  the	  dark.	  Usually	  they	  have,	  or	  are	  able	  to	  accumulate,	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  relevant	  information.	  	  Nonetheless,	  modern	  followers	  of	  Hayek	  are	  correct	  to	  emphasize	  what	  they	  call	  “the	  knowledge	  problem,”	  understood	  as	  the	  government’s	  potential	  ignorance,	  which	  can	  be	  a	  problem	  for	  contemporary	  regulators	  of	  all	  kinds,	  working	  (for	  example)	  to	  implement	  the	  Clean	  Air	  Act,	  the	  Occupational	  Safety	  and	  Health	  Act,	  the	  Affordable	  Care	  Act,	  and	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Wall	  Street	  Reform	  and	  Consumer	  Protection	  Act.	  If	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  is	  essential	  to	  sensible	  judgments,	  incomplete	  knowledge,	  when	  it	  exists,	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  serious	  and	  potentially	  devastating	  problem.	  In	  some	  cases,	  agencies	  do	  face	  serious	  challenges	  in	  cataloguing	  costs	  and	  benefits.7	  Retrospective	  analysis	  attests	  to	  those	  challenges,	  because	  it	  has	  identified	  a	  number	  of	  mistakes.8	  	  The	  tension,	  in	  short,	  is	  that	  regulators	  have	  to	  focus	  on	  costs	  and	  benefits	  (the	  first	  indispensable	  idea),	  but	  they	  will	  sometimes	  lack	  the	  information	  that	  would	  enable	  them	  to	  make	  accurate	  assessments	  (the	  second	  indispensable	  idea).	  In	  light	  of	  the	  knowledge	  problem,	  can	  they	  produce	  reliable	  cost-­‐benefit	  analyses,	  or	  any	  other	  kind	  of	  projection	  of	  the	  human	  consequences	  of	  what	  they	  seek	  to	  do,	  and	  of	  potential	  alternatives?	  What	  I	  am	  urging,	  in	  short,	  is	  that	  regulators	  are	  in	  large	  part	  technocrats,	  charged	  with	  measuring	  and	  assessing	  consequences,	  but	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  See	  Cass	  R.	  Sunstein,	  The	  Real	  World	  of	  Cost-­‐Benefit	  Analysis,	  114	  Colum	  L	  Rev	  167	  (2014).	  6	  See	  OMB	  Circular	  A-­‐4,	  available	  at	  http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-­‐4	  7	  For	  an	  emphasis	  on	  this	  point,	  see	  John	  Coates,	  Cost-­‐Benefit	  Analysis	  of	  Financial	  Regulation,	  Yale	  LJ	  (forthcoming	  2014),	  available	  at	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2375396.	  I	  do	  not	  address	  here	  the	  question	  of	  the	  judicial	  role	  in	  requiring	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis.	  Relevant	  discussion,	  with	  disagreement	  between	  the	  two	  authors,	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Cass	  R.	  Sunstein	  and	  Adrian	  Vermeule,	  Libertarian	  Administrative	  Law,	  U	  Chi	  L	  Rev	  (forthcoming	  2015).	  	  8	  See	  infra.	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their	  technocratic	  enterprise	  runs	  into	  a	  serious	  objection.	  Of	  course	  the	  force	  of	  the	  objection	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  context,	  but	  in	  some	  situations,	  the	  effort	  to	  assess	  the	  likely	  effects	  of	  a	  regulatory	  intervention	  (involving	  pollution,	  health	  care,	  energy,	  transportation	  safety,	  communications,	  or	  homeland	  security)	  might	  go	  badly	  wrong.	  	  Three	  reforms	  can	  help.9	  The	  first	  involves	  the	  process	  of	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  rulemaking,	  updated	  for	  the	  current	  era,	  and	  with	  a	  clear	  sense	  of	  the	  underlying	  substantive	  goal,	  which	  is	  to	  obtain	  information	  about	  the	  likely	  consequences	  of	  regulations	  (including	  costs	  and	  benefits).	  The	  second	  involves	  retrospective	  analysis	  of	  rules,	  which	  can	  both	  produce	  changes	  in	  those	  rules	  and	  lead	  to	  significant	  improvements	  in	  prospective	  analysis.	  To	  realize	  its	  potential,	  retrospective	  analysis	  should	  be	  undertaken	  with	  public	  comment.	  The	  third	  reform	  involves	  careful	  experiments,	  above	  all	  randomized	  controlled	  trials,	  which	  can	  provide	  far	  better	  information	  than	  expert	  judgments.10	  In	  some	  ways,	  the	  third	  reform	  is	  the	  most	  promising,	  but	  it	  does	  present	  challenges	  in	  terms	  of	  feasibility.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  I	  am	  not	  suggesting	  that	  Hayek	  himself	  would	  be	  satisfied.	  Consider	  this	  remarkable	  passage:	  	   This	  is,	  perhaps,	  also	  the	  point	  where	  I	  should	  briefly	  mention	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  sort	  of	  knowledge	  with	  which	  I	  have	  been	  concerned	  is	  knowledge	  of	  the	  kind	  which	  by	  its	  nature	  cannot	  enter	  into	  statistics	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  be	  conveyed	  to	  any	  central	  authority	  in	  statistical	  form.	  The	  statistics	  which	  such	  a	  central	  authority	  would	  have	  to	  use	  would	  have	  to	  be	  arrived	  at	  precisely	  by	  abstracting	  from	  minor	  differences	  between	  the	  things,	  by	  lumping	  together,	  as	  resources	  of	  one	  kind,	  items	  which	  differ	  as	  regards	  location,	  quality,	  and	  other	  particulars,	  in	  a	  way	  which	  may	  be	  very	  significant	  for	  the	  specific	  decision.	  It	  follows	  from	  this	  that	  central	  planning	  based	  on	  statistical	  information	  by	  its	  nature	  cannot	  take	  direct	  account	  of	  these	  circumstances	  of	  time	  and	  place	  and	  that	  the	  central	  planner	  will	  have	  to	  find	  some	  way	  or	  other	  in	  which	  the	  decisions	  depending	  on	  them	  can	  be	  left	  to	  the	  "man	  on	  the	  spot."'	  	  Hayek,	  supra	  note.	  In	  my	  view,	  the	  claim	  here	  is	  a	  mystification,	  at	  least	  as	  applied	  to	  the	  regulatory	  context.	  Statistical	  information	  “by	  its	  nature”	  can	  indeed	  “take	  direct	  account	  of	  these	  circumstances	  of	  time	  and	  place.”	  Of	  course	  it	  is	  true	  that	  for	  some	  purposes	  and	  activities,	  statistical	  knowledge	  is	  inadequate.	  10	  Duncan	  Watts,	  Everything	  is	  Obvious	  (2011);	  Jim	  Manzi,	  Uncontrolled:	  The	  Surprising	  Payoff	  of	  Trial-­‐and-­‐Error	  for	  Business,	  Politics,	  and	  Society	  (2012);	  Michael	  Greenstone,	  Toward	  a	  Culture	  of	  Persistent	  Regulatory	  Experimentation	  and	  Evaluation,	  in	  NEW	  PERSPECTIVES	  ON	  REGULATION	  113,	  113	  (David	  Moss	  &	  John	  Cisterno	  eds.,	  2009).	  A	  relevant	  discussion,	  involving	  quasi-­‐experimental	  techniques	  in	  an	  especially	  important	  area,	  is	  Francesca	  Dominici	  et	  al.,	  Particulate	  Matter	  Matters,	  244	  Science	  257	  (2014).	  It	  is	  true	  that	  randomized	  controlled	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II.	  An	  Old	  Debate	  	  During	  and	  after	  Franklin	  Delano	  Roosevelt’s	  New	  Deal,	  the	  United	  States	  saw	  an	  intense	  debate	  about	  government	  regulation.11	  The	  competing	  sides	  were	  the	  New	  Deal	  enthusiasts,	  receptive	  to	  the	  larger	  regulatory	  state,12	  and	  the	  New	  Deal	  critics,	  insisting	  that	  the	  new	  administrative	  institutions	  were	  a	  betrayal	  of	  constitutional	  ideals.	  One	  of	  the	  enduring	  products	  of	  that	  debate	  was	  the	  Administrative	  Procedure	  Act	  (APA),	  enacted	  in	  1946.13	  The	  APA	  contained	  a	  genuine	  innovation,	  now	  called	  “notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  rulemaking.”14	  The	  basic	  idea	  is	  that	  regulators	  do	  not	  merely	  consult	  with	  one	  another	  and	  then	  issue	  final	  rules.	  Instead,	  they	  must	  provide	  the	  public	  with	  advance	  notice	  of	  what	  they	  are	  planning	  to	  do,	  and	  why,	  and	  then	  they	  solicit	  comments.	  It	  was	  expected	  that	  when	  agencies	  finalized	  rules,	  they	  would	  incorporate	  what	  they	  learned	  from	  the	  public.	  	  Why	  did	  Congress	  call	  for	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  rulemaking?	  The	  historical	  record	  does	  not	  give	  an	  unambiguous	  answer,	  but	  we	  can	  isolate	  two	  quite	  different	  factors.	  The	  first	  involves	  self-­‐government	  itself.	  During	  and	  after	  the	  New	  Deal,	  some	  people	  have	  been	  greatly	  concerned	  that	  regulators	  are	  not	  directly	  accountable	  to	  the	  people,	  and	  have	  contended	  that	  they	  may	  suffer	  from	  some	  kind	  of	  “democracy	  deficit.”15	  In	  an	  extreme	  view,	  the	  result	  is	  some	  kind	  of	  crisis	  of	  legitimacy.16	  For	  such	  critics,	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  rulemaking	  may	  not	  be	  sufficient,	  but	  it	  is	  an	  important	  way	  to	  help	  legitimate	  the	  administrative	  process,	  by	  increasing	  accountability	  and	  responsiveness.	  A	  kind	  of	  democratic	  participation	  is	  built	  into	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  rulemaking.	  That	  admittedly	  technical	  idea	  is	  designed	  to	  help	  to	  ensure	  ultimate	  rule,	  or	  at	  least	  access,	  by	  We	  the	  People.	  If	  administrators	  are	  not	  directly	  accountable	  through	  elections,	  at	  least	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  they	  must	  listen	  and	  respond	  to	  the	  public	  insofar	  as	  its	  members	  are	  willing	  to	  raise	  objections	  and	  concerns.	  	  The	  second	  idea	  is	  less	  abstract	  and	  high-­‐flown,	  and	  it	  is,	  I	  think,	  even	  more	  important.	  It	  involves	  information,	  not	  legitimation,	  and	  it	  has	  roots	  in	  Hayek’s	  concerns.17	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  if	  government	  is	  attempting	  to	  make	  air	  cleaner	  or	  food	  safer,	  to	  reduce	  deaths	  in	  the	  workplace	  or	  on	  the	  highways,	  or	  to	  increase	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  experiments	  have	  been	  subject	  to	  some	  concerns.	  See	  Angus	  Deaton,	  Instruments	  of	  Development	  (2009),	  available	  at	  http://www.nber.org/papers/w14690	  11	  See	  Daniel	  Ernst,	  Toqueville’s	  Nightmare	  (2013),	  for	  a	  valuable	  discussion	  of	  the	  background.	  12	  The	  classic	  discussion	  is	  James	  Landis,	  The	  Administrative	  Process	  (1935).	  13	  5	  USC	  551	  et	  seq.	  14	  5	  USC	  553.	  15	  For	  an	  extreme	  version	  of	  this	  argument,	  see	  Philip	  Hamburger,	  Is	  Administrative	  Law	  Unlawful?	  (2014).	  16	  See	  James	  O.	  Freedman,	  Crisis	  and	  Legitimacy	  (1980).	  17	  But	  see	  note	  supra.	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homeland	  security,	  it	  might	  well	  have	  incomplete	  information	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  its	  plans.	  Some	  nonhypothetical	  examples:	  If	  regulators	  are	  concerned	  to	  eliminate	  emissions	  of	  ozone-­‐depleting	  chemicals,	  they	  might	  end	  up	  banning	  asthma	  inhalers,	  and	  such	  bans	  might	  have	  adverse	  effects	  on	  human	  health.	  If	  regulators	  take	  steps	  to	  make	  the	  food	  supply	  safer,	  they	  might	  impose	  high	  costs	  on	  farmers,	  including	  small	  farmers,	  and	  potentially	  create	  serious	  economics	  dislocations.	  If	  government	  imposes	  high	  costs	  on	  electricity	  producers,	  it	  might	  produce	  a	  spike	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  electricity,	  which	  would	  be	  particularly	  harmful	  for	  the	  poor.	  	  	  To	  make	  sensible	  decisions,	  regulators	  need	  to	  obtain	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  information	  about	  questions	  of	  this	  kind.	  As	  hard	  as	  they	  might	  try,	  they	  will	  not	  know	  everything,	  and	  they	  may	  have	  significant	  gaps	  in	  their	  knowledge.	  Within	  government,	  those	  with	  technical	  expertise	  will	  try	  to	  fill	  those	  gaps,	  but	  their	  efforts	  might	  be	  insufficient.	  Here	  is	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  process.	  If	  regulators	  have	  made	  mistakes	  or	  been	  too	  optimistic,	  there	  is	  a	  real	  chance	  that	  members	  of	  the	  public	  will	  tell	  them	  about	  it.18	  Their	  own	  assessment	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  a	  proposed	  rule	  might	  depend	  on	  unrealistic	  assumptions.19	  If	  so,	  someone	  might	  well	  object	  on	  that	  ground.	  Regulators	  might	  not	  have	  seen	  how	  a	  well-­‐intended	  rule	  would	  affect	  small	  business.	  Their	  scientific	  projections	  might	  not	  be	  consistent	  with	  recent	  scientific	  findings.	  They	  might	  have	  neglected	  local	  circumstances,	  falling	  to	  understand	  that	  makes	  sense	  in	  Los	  Angeles	  and	  New	  York	  is	  unnecessary	  or	  even	  harmful	  in	  Carson	  City	  and	  Boise.	  	  They	  might	  have	  missed	  the	  potential	  effects	  of	  a	  low-­‐cost	  technology.	  They	  might	  not	  have	  appreciated	  the	  possibility	  that	  another	  approach	  would	  have	  higher	  net	  benefits.20	  	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  most	  important	  goal	  of	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  rulemaking	  is	  to	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  that	  agencies	  will	  obtain	  relevant	  information.	  Some	  of	  that	  information	  might	  come	  from	  technical	  specialists	  outside	  of	  government,	  who	  can	  correct	  agency	  errors	  (about,	  for	  example,	  the	  carcinogenic	  properties	  of	  silica,	  the	  social	  cost	  of	  carbon,	  or	  the	  likely	  costs	  of	  emissions	  controls).	  Some	  of	  it	  might	  come	  from	  private	  associations	  with	  distinctive	  knowledge	  of	  particular	  sectors.	  Some	  of	  it	  might	  come	  from	  people	  with	  highly	  localized	  knowledge,	  which	  might	  escape	  the	  regulators’	  attention.	  If	  the	  knowledge	  problem	  cannot	  always	  be	  eliminated	  –	  and	  it	  would	  be	  foolish	  to	  think	  that	  it	  can	  be	  –	  at	  least	  it	  can	  be	  reduced,	  in	  part	  through	  institutions	  that	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  that	  public	  officials	  will	  learn	  from	  what	  members	  of	  the	  public	  know.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  For	  a	  prominent	  example,	  see	  https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=19119	  19	  Id.	  20For	  an	  example,	  see	  http://water.epa.gov/scitech/wastetech/guide/airport/upload/airport_prepub.pdf;	  	  http://www.cryotech.com/epa-­‐releases-­‐ruling-­‐on-­‐effluent-­‐limitations-­‐for-­‐airports-­‐cryotech-­‐pavement-­‐deicers-­‐comply	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It	  is	  important	  to	  emphasize	  that	  the	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  process	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way	  for	  agencies	  to	  obtain	  dispersed	  knowledge.	  Regulators	  often	  engage	  in	  extensive	  consultations	  before	  rules	  are	  even	  proposed	  –	  sometimes	  through	  informal	  routes,	  sometimes	  through	  formal	  “requests	  for	  information”	  (published	  in	  the	  Federal	  Register),	  sometimes	  through	  advance	  notices	  of	  proposed	  rulemaking.	  All	  of	  these	  strategies	  are	  indispensable.	  Executive	  Order	  13563	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  state,	  “Before	  issuing	  a	  notice	  of	  proposed	  rulemaking,	  each	  agency,	  where	  feasible	  and	  appropriate,	  shall	  seek	  the	  views	  of	  those	  who	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  affected,	  including	  those	  who	  are	  likely	  to	  benefit	  from	  and	  those	  who	  are	  potentially	  subject	  to	  such	  rulemaking.”21	  The	  various	  forms	  of	  information-­‐gathering	  –	  preliminary	  to	  proposed	  rulemaking	  –	  can	  be	  essential	  to	  accurate	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis.	  	  
III.	  Unrealized	  Potential	  	  In	  the	  initial	  decades	  after	  enactment	  of	  the	  APA,	  some	  people	  greatly	  admired	  the	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  process,	  celebrating	  its	  immense	  potential	  for	  providing	  valuable	  information.	  But	  it	  did	  not	  realize	  that	  potential.	  There	  were	  two	  reasons.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  for	  decades,	  many	  regulatory	  agencies	  relied	  on	  adjudication,	  rather	  than	  rulemaking,	  to	  make	  public	  policy.	  Instead	  of	  proposing	  a	  new	  regulation,	  for	  example,	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  would	  initiate	  a	  proceeding	  against	  someone	  who	  engaged	  in	  apparently	  deceptive	  advertising,	  and	  it	  would	  produce	  the	  functional	  equivalent	  of	  a	  new	  rule	  as	  a	  result	  of	  that	  proceeding.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  this	  kind	  of	  approach	  –	  policymaking	  by	  adjudication	  -­‐-­‐	  was	  far	  from	  ideal,	  in	  part	  because	  regulators	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  hear	  from	  enough	  people.	  Moreover,	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  does	  not	  precede	  or	  accompany	  the	  orders	  that	  emerge	  form	  adjudication.	  For	  multiple	  reasons,	  the	  rule-­‐like	  decisions	  that	  follow	  adjudication	  might	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  inadequately	  informed.	  But	  since	  the	  1980s,	  and	  in	  part	  for	  this	  very	  reason,	  agencies	  have	  chosen	  to	  rely	  far	  more	  on	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  rulemaking	  (with	  the	  continuing	  and	  disappointing	  exception	  of	  the	  National	  Labor	  Relations	  Board,	  which	  relies	  on	  adjudication	  to	  this	  day22).	  	  The	  second	  reason	  is	  that	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  most	  members	  of	  the	  public,	  the	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  process	  has	  been	  quite	  arcane	  –	  unknown	  and	  even	  unfathomable.	  It	  is	  not	  exactly	  simple	  to	  send	  comments	  to	  regulators,	  or	  for	  regulators	  to	  read	  and	  assess	  everything	  that	  they	  receive.	  At	  least	  part	  of	  the	  problem	  can	  be	  captured	  in	  a	  single	  word:	  paper.	  So	  long	  as	  everything	  was	  received	  and	  read	  in	  hard	  copy,	  there	  were	  significant	  limits	  to	  the	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  process.	  Among	  other	  things,	  those	  who	  sought	  to	  file	  comments	  could	  not	  necessarily	  or	  easily	  see	  the	  comments	  send	  by	  other	  people.	  For	  the	  process	  to	  work	  as	  well	  as	  it	  might,	  that	  kind	  of	  visibility,	  and	  a	  substantive	  back-­‐and-­‐forth,	  could	  be	  exceedingly	  important.	  There	  is	  an	  enduring	  ideal	  of	  “government	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Executive	  Order	  13563,	  available	  at	  http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-­‐2011-­‐01-­‐21/pdf/2011-­‐1385.pdf	  22	  For	  an	  implicit	  lament,	  see	  Allentown	  Mack	  Sales	  and	  Services	  v.	  NLRB,	  522	  US	  359	  (1998).	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discussion”23;	  that	  ideal	  cannot	  be	  realized	  if	  substantive	  ideas	  are	  not	  broadly	  visible.	  	  
IV.	  The	  Age	  of	  E-­‐Rulemaking	  	  We	  have	  now	  entered	  the	  age	  of	  e-­‐rulemaking,	  thanks	  in	  part	  to	  Executive	  Order	  13563,	  issued	  by	  President	  Obama	  in	  2011	  and	  serving	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  mini-­‐Constitution	  for	  the	  regulatory	  state.	  (Regulations.gov	  is	  the	  key	  website.)	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  that	  Executive	  Order	  promises	  to	  reduce	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  two	  indispensable	  ideas	  with	  which	  I	  began	  by	  increasing	  the	  likelihood	  that	  regulators	  will	  have	  access	  to	  dispersed	  information.	  	  	  
A. Regulations.gov	  	  Among	  other	  things,	  Executive	  Order	  13563	  requires	  regulations	  to	  be	  adopted	  	  “through	  a	  process	  that	  involves	  public	  participation.”24	  It	  directs	  agencies	  to	  “afford	  the	  public	  a	  meaningful	  opportunity	  to	  comment	  through	  the	  Internet	  on	  any	  proposed	  regulation,	  with	  a	  comment	  period	  that	  should	  generally	  be	  at	  least	  60	  days.”	  Importantly,	  it	  requires	  agencies	  to	  “provide,	  for	  both	  proposed	  and	  final	  rules,	  timely	  online	  access	  to	  the	  rulemaking	  docket	  on	  regulations.gov,	  including	  relevant	  scientific	  and	  technical	  findings,	  in	  an	  open	  format	  that	  can	  be	  easily	  searched	  and	  downloaded.”	  	  	  For	  proposed	  rules,	  that	  access	  must	  include	  an	  “opportunity	  for	  public	  comment	  on	  all	  pertinent	  parts	  of	  the	  rulemaking	  docket,	  including	  relevant	  scientific	  and	  technical	  findings.”	  Do	  not	  be	  fooled	  by	  the	  technical	  jargon	  (“rulemaking	  docket”)	  in	  that	  last	  sentence.	  It	  means,	  in	  essence,	  that	  members	  of	  the	  public	  are	  allowed	  to	  see	  technical	  support	  for	  regulations,	  including	  the	  analysis	  of	  costs	  and	  benefits,	  and	  also	  to	  see	  public	  comments	  themselves.	  That	  form	  of	  transparency	  is	  exceedingly	  important,	  because	  it	  triggers	  public	  scrutiny	  and	  generates	  a	  great	  deal	  in	  the	  way	  of	  additional	  information.	  	  Regulations.gov	  may	  not	  be	  everyone’s	  favorite	  website,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  a	  lot	  of	  fun,	  but	  it	  has	  transformed	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  rulemaking.	  When	  the	  agency	  proposes	  a	  rule,	  all	  the	  world	  can	  find	  it	  and	  see	  it,	  usually	  with	  great	  ease.	  Both	  the	  rule	  and	  the	  technical	  analyses	  are	  standardly	  available.	  If	  the	  proposal	  has	  a	  mistake,	  or	  veers	  in	  a	  bad	  direction,	  there	  is	  a	  genuine	  opportunity	  to	  comment	  and	  to	  get	  the	  problem	  fixed.	  When	  I	  served	  as	  Administrator	  of	  the	  White	  House	  Office	  of	  Information	  and	  Regulatory	  Affairs	  from	  2009	  to	  2012,	  I	  was	  surprised	  by	  one	  thing	  above	  all:	  Many	  regulators	  pay	  exceedingly	  close	  attention	  to	  public	  comments,	  and	  they	  spend	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  on	  regulations.gov.	  Such	  comments	  are	  carefully	  read,	  typically	  by	  people	  who	  have	  the	  actual	  authority	  to	  move	  regulations	  in	  better	  directions.	  (Such	  people	  including	  officials	  in	  the	  rulemaking	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  See	  Amartya	  Sen,	  The	  Idea	  of	  Justice	  (2010).	  24	  See	  note	  supra.	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agency,	  in	  OIRA,	  and	  in	  various	  White	  House	  offices,	  such	  as	  the	  Domestic	  Policy	  Council	  and	  the	  National	  Economic	  Council.25)	  	  Very	  often,	  they	  do	  so	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  they	  learn.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  process	  is	  hardly	  a	  charade.	  With	  respect	  to	  regulation,	  it	  is	  a	  central	  part	  of	  agency	  decisionmaking.	  	  In	  the	  modern	  era,	  regulators	  are	  in	  a	  far	  better	  position	  to	  collect	  the	  dispersed	  information	  of	  the	  public.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  goal	  of	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  rulemaking	  is	  emphatically	  not	  to	  take	  an	  opinion	  poll,	  to	  take	  some	  kind	  of	  political	  temperature,	  to	  see	  how	  much	  applause	  a	  proposal	  is	  able	  to	  attract,	  to	  defuse	  public	  opposition,	  to	  engage	  in	  some	  communications	  strategy,	  or	  to	  collect	  the	  digital	  equivalent	  of	  postcards	  (even	  though	  a	  number	  of	  those	  are	  sometimes	  sent	  in).	  Instead	  the	  goal	  is	  overwhelmingly	  substantive	  –	  to	  fill	  gaps	  in	  knowledge	  and	  to	  see	  what	  might	  have	  been	  overlooked.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  agency’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  likely	  consequences	  is	  subject	  to	  close	  scrutiny.	  If	  the	  agency	  has	  inaccurately	  assessed	  costs	  and	  benefits,	  public	  participation	  can	  and	  often	  will	  supply	  a	  corrective.	  Democratization	  of	  the	  regulatory	  process,	  through	  the	  comment	  process,	  has	  an	  epistemic	  value.26	  It	  helps	  to	  collect	  dispersed	  knowledge	  and	  to	  bring	  it	  to	  bear	  on	  official	  choices.	  	  
B.	  The	  Challenge	  of	  Complexity	  	  It	  is	  true	  that	  many	  rules	  continue	  to	  be	  lengthy	  and	  complex.	  For	  the	  public	  comment	  process	  to	  work,	  they	  must	  be	  comprehensible	  rather	  than	  opaque,	  and	  technical	  language	  and	  sheer	  length	  can	  reduce	  comprehensibility.	  Executive	  summaries,	  now	  required	  for	  long	  or	  complex	  rules,	  can	  help,27	  but	  they	  are	  not	  sufficient.	  Experiments	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  “regulation	  room,”28	  offering	  plain	  language	  versions	  of	  regulatory	  proposals,	  are	  designed	  to	  promote	  broader	  understanding,	  but	  those	  experiments	  have	  not	  been	  an	  unambiguous	  success.	  Some	  of	  the	  relevant	  comments,	  in	  those	  experiments,	  look	  like	  simple	  thumbs-­‐up	  or	  thumbs-­‐down,	  and	  because	  they	  fail	  to	  provide	  new	  information,	  they	  do	  not	  genuinely	  inform	  regulatory	  judgments.	  	  To	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  challenge	  of	  complex	  rules,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  two	  conceptions	  of	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  public	  comment	  process.	  On	  one	  conception,	  connected	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  legitimation,	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  allow	  We	  the	  People	  –	  anyone,	  really	  –	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  process.	  If	  so,	  intelligibility	  and	  clarity	  are	  indispensable,	  and	  complexity	  is	  a	  genuinely	  serious	  problem.	  On	  another	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  See	  Cass	  R.	  Sunstein,	  The	  Office	  of	  Information	  and	  Regulatory	  Affairs:	  Myths	  and	  Realities,	  126	  Harv	  L	  Rev	  1838	  (2013).	  26	  For	  relevant	  discussion,	  see	  Adrian	  Vermeule,	  Local	  and	  Global	  Knowledge	  in	  the	  Administrative	  State	  (2012),	  available	  at	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2169939	  27	  http://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/02/OIRA-­‐clarifying-­‐regulatory-­‐requirements-­‐executive-­‐summaries.pdf	  28	  See	  http://regulationroom.org/	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conception,	  connected	  with	  the	  epistemic	  idea,	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  allow	  participation	  by	  those	  who	  have	  relevant	  information	  to	  contribute.	  If	  so,	  intelligibility	  and	  clarity	  are	  important,	  but	  because	  the	  process	  typically	  has	  a	  large	  technical	  component,	  the	  absence	  of	  genuine	  “plain	  language”	  need	  not	  be	  a	  fatal	  flaw,	  so	  long	  as	  those	  who	  have	  relevant	  information	  to	  add	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  do	  so.	  	  
C. Of	  Hubris	  and	  Risks	  	   It	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  even	  in	  its	  most	  ambitious	  forms,	  and	  even	  if	  we	  emphasize	  the	  overriding	  importance	  of	  substantive	  contributions,	  the	  public	  comment	  process	  might	  fail	  to	  solve	  the	  knowledge	  problem,	  and	  there	  are	  imaginable	  risks	  as	  well.	  Centralized	  planning,	  of	  the	  old-­‐style	  socialist	  sort,	  could	  hardly	  be	  redeemed	  by	  public	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  five-­‐year	  plans	  would	  likely	  be	  improved	  by	  efforts	  to	  receive	  public	  comments,	  but	  we	  should	  not,	  for	  that	  reason,	  favor	  five-­‐year	  plans.	  Dedicated	  followers	  of	  Hayek	  would	  urge	  that	  the	  process	  of	  aggregating	  information	  will	  inevitably	  be	  imperfect	  and	  (in	  their	  view)	  probably	  worse	  than	  that.29	  Markets	  encode	  the	  emphatically	  local	  knowledge	  and	  values	  of	  everyone	  who	  produces	  or	  purchases	  relevant	  products.	  By	  contrast,	  most	  citizens,	  including	  many	  with	  substantive	  contributions	  to	  make,	  are	  unlikely	  to	  know	  about	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  rulemaking,	  or	  to	  have	  the	  commitment	  and	  background	  that	  would	  enable	  them	  to	  participate.	  	  There	  are	  strong	  reasons	  to	  demand	  a	  convincing	  demonstration	  of	  some	  kind	  of	  market	  failure	  before	  embarking	  on	  regulation.30	  An	  even	  if	  a	  market	  failure	  is	  shown,	  market-­‐friendly	  responses	  (such	  as	  disclosure	  of	  information	  or	  corrective	  taxes)	  deserve	  pride	  of	  place,	  in	  part	  because	  they	  reduce	  informational	  demands	  on	  regulators	  and	  can	  enlist	  rather	  than	  displace	  private	  knowledge.	  	  There	  is	  an	  independent	  point.	  It	  would	  be	  possible	  to	  fear	  that	  well-­‐organized	  groups,	  of	  one	  of	  another	  kind,	  will	  inevitably	  play	  the´	  most	  important	  part	  in	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  rulemaking,	  and	  even	  to	  dominate	  it.	  If	  so,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  kind	  of	  epistemic	  “skew”	  on	  the	  part	  of	  regulators.	  The	  supposed	  solution	  to	  the	  knowledge	  problem	  may	  make	  things	  even	  worse.	  The	  most	  frequent	  comments,	  and	  the	  most	  competent	  ones,	  will	  come	  from	  those	  whose	  self-­‐interest	  is	  at	  stake,	  thus	  creating	  a	  distinctive	  form	  of	  capture,	  one	  that	  is	  epistemic	  in	  nature.	  	  This	  risk	  cannot	  be	  dismissed	  in	  the	  abstract.	  It	  may	  well	  be	  realized	  in	  practice.	  But	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  public	  officials	  are	  fully	  able	  to	  discount	  self-­‐serving	  arguments,	  	  and	  to	  give	  critical	  scrutiny	  to	  external	  arguments	  and	  claims	  (often	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  public	  comments).	  During	  my	  period	  in	  government,	  I	  witnessed	  this	  process	  every	  day.	  Within	  the	  executive	  branch,	  people	  work	  exceedingly	  hard	  to	  produce	  solutions	  that	  are	  sensible,	  whether	  or	  not	  particular	  interest	  groups	  like	  them.	  Insofar	  as	  diverse	  regulators	  are	  working	  together	  to	  produce	  lawful	  regulations,	  justified	  by	  costs	  and	  benefits,	  members	  of	  the	  public,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  See	  note	  supra.	  30	  See	  id.	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the	  media,	  and	  academic	  observers	  wildly	  overstate	  the	  role	  of	  interest	  groups	  and	  even	  of	  political	  pressures.	  For	  regulators,	  the	  principal	  problem	  is	  not	  such	  pressures;	  it	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  information.31	  On	  that	  count,	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  rulemaking	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  crucial.	  	  	  In	  the	  coming	  decades,	  the	  ability	  to	  elicit	  and	  compile	  information	  will	  inevitably	  expand	  at	  an	  extraordinarily	  rapid	  rate.	  A	  pressing	  question	  is	  how	  to	  use	  that	  information	  to	  reduce	  the	  risks	  of	  regulatory	  error,	  not	  least	  with	  respect	  to	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  itself.	  We	  could	  easily	  imagine	  large-­‐scale	  improvements	  on	  this	  count	  as	  massive	  data	  sets	  become	  increasingly	  simple	  to	  compile	  and	  analyze.	  In	  the	  fullness	  of	  time,	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  rulemaking	  will	  become,	  far	  more	  than	  it	  is	  today,	  a	  major	  contributor	  to	  forms	  of	  data	  acquisition	  that	  are	  indispensable	  to	  accurate	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis.	  	  
V.	  Retrospective	  Analysis	  
 	   Agency	   rulemaking	   occurs	   before	   the	   fact,	   when	   information-­‐gathering	   is	  highly	   likely	   to	   be	   imperfect.32 	  A	   sensible	   regulatory	   system	   gives	   continuing	  scrutiny	  to	  regulatory	  requirements	  to	  test	  whether	  they	  are	  working	  as	  anticipated.	  A	  central	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  ex	  ante	  estimates	  square	  with	  what	   is	  known	  ex	  post.	   If	   they	   do	   not,	   regulations	   can	   be	   changed.	   There	   is	   another	   advantage	   to	  retrospective	   analysis:	   It	   can	   help	   to	   inform	   and	   improve	   prospective	   analysis,	   as	  agencies	  learn	  about	  their	  own	  mistakes,	  and	  can	  become	  less	  likely	  to	  make	  them	  in	  the	   future.	   In	   this	   respect,	   retrospective	   analysis	   can	   help	   to	   reform	   prospective	  analysis.	  	  	   On	   these	  counts,	   existing	  knowledge	  remains	   incomplete,	  but	   some	  valuable	  research	  can	  be	  found.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  Winston	  Harrington’s	  careful	  study.33 Building	  on	  previous	  work,	  Harrington	  explored	  sixty-­‐one	  rules	   for	  which	  benefit-­‐cost	  ratios	  could	  be	  compared	  before	  and	  after	  the	  fact.	  He	  found	  significant	  errors	  –	  but	   no	   systematic	   bias.	   In	   his	   account,	   agencies	   overestimated	   both	   benefits	   and	  costs	  with	  about	  equal	  frequency.	  Specifically,	   in	  sixteen	  of	  the	  sixty-­‐one	  cases,	  the	  ratios	   were	   found	   to	   be	   essentially	   accurate.	   In	   twenty-­‐four	   cases,	   the	   ratio	   was	  better,	   not	  worse,	   than	   the	   agency	   had	   anticipated.	   In	   twenty-­‐one	   cases,	   the	   ratio	  was	  worse	  than	  anticipated.	  Harrington’s	  general	  conclusion	  is	  that	  while	  both	  costs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  My	  own	  experience	  suggests	  that	  academics	  wildly	  overstate	  the	  public	  choice	  problem,	  at	  least	  as	  it	  operates	  within	  the	  executive	  branch.	  But	  they	  do	  not	  overstate,	  and	  may	  even	  understate,	  the	  knowledge	  problem.	  32	  The	  point	  is	  emphasized	  in	  Greenstone,	  supra	  note.	  I	  draw	  in	  this	  section	  and	  in	  the	  following	  on	  Cass	  R.	  Sunstein,	  Simpler	  (2013)	  and	  Cass	  R.	  Sunstein,	  The	  Regulatory	  Lookback,	  94	  B.U.	  L.	  Rev.	  579	  (2014).	  33 Winston	   Harrington,	   Grading	   Estimates	   of	   the	   Benefits	   and	   Costs	   of	   Federal	  
Regulation	   (Res.	   for	   the	   Future,	   Paper	   No.	   06-­‐39,	   2006),	   available	   at	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=937357.	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and	  benefits	  tend	  to	  be	  lower	  than	  estimated,	  no	  bias	  can	  be	  found	  in	  estimates	  of	  benefit-­‐cost	  ratios.	  
 	   While	   highly	   illuminating,	   Harrington’s	   study	   leaves	   many	   questions	  unanswered.	  The	  same	  size	  is	  exceedingly	  small.	  Harrington	  focuses	  on	  benefit-­‐cost	  ratios,	   which	   is	   certainly	   a	   relevant	   question	   but	   not	   the	   central	   one.	  What	  most	  matters	   is	  net	  benefits	   and	  whether	  agencies	  have	  accurately	   calculated	   them.	  Nor	  does	   Harrington	   specify	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   benefits	   and	   costs	   were	  underestimated	   or	   overestimated.	   Other	   studies	   do	   explore	   the	   question	   of	  underestimation	   or	   overestimation.	   One	   such	   study	   analyzed	   twenty-­‐one	  environmental	   and	   occupational	   safety	   regulations	   for	   which	   retrospective	  estimates	   could	  be	   found.34 The	  basic	   conclusion	   is	   that	   agencies	  display	  a	  modest	  tendency	   to	   overestimate	   costs.	   For	   thirteen	   rules,	   agencies	   overestimated	   costs;	  they	   estimated	   costs	   accurately	   for	   four;	   they	   underestimated	   for	   three;	   and	   the	  costs	  were	  indeterminate	  for	  one.	  
 	   In	  2005,	  the	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  Office	  of	  Information	   and	   Regulatory	   Affairs,	   provided	   an	   overview	   of	   many	   retrospective	  analyses	  based	  on	  an	  examination	  of	  forty-­‐seven	  case	  studies.35	  A	  particular	  concern	  was	   the	  risk	   that	  ex	  ante	  estimates	  might	  be	   inadequately	   informed	  and	   therefore	  erroneous. The	  overview	  offers	  three	  key	  conclusions.	  First,	  agencies	  were	  far	  more	  likely	   to	   overestimate	   benefits	   than	   to	   underestimate	   them.	   More	   particularly,	  agencies	   overestimated	   benefits	   forty	   percent	   of	   the	   time,	   whereas	   they	  underestimated	  benefits	   only	   two	  percent	   of	   the	   time.	   Second,	   agencies	   tended	   to	  overestimate	  the	  benefit-­‐cost	  ratio,	  and	  in	  that	  sense	  to	  be	  a	  bit	  too	  optimistic	  about	  the	   consequences	   of	   their	   rules.	   Agency	   estimates	   were	   accurate	   twenty-­‐three	  percent	   of	   the	   time,	  while	   the	   ratio	  was	   overestimated	   forty-­‐seven	   percent	   of	   the	  time	   and	   underestimated	   thirty	   percent	   of	   the	   time.	   Third,	   agencies	  were	   slightly	  more	   likely	   to	   overestimate	   than	   to	   underestimate	   costs.	   Agencies	   were	   accurate	  twenty-­‐six	  percent	  of	  the	  time,	  overestimated	  	  costs	  thirty-­‐four	  percent	  of	  the	  time,	  and	  underestimated	  costs	  twenty-­‐six	  percent	  of	  the	  time. 
 	   From	  existing	  work,	  the	  most	  sensible	  general	  conclusion	  is	  that	  agencies	  do	  make	  many	  mistakes	  (attesting	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  knowledge	  problem),	  but	  there	  does	   not	   appear	   to	   be	   a	   systematic	   bias	   in	   any	   one	   direction.	   That	   is	   useful	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34 Winston	  Harrington	  et	   al.,	  On	  the	  Accuracy	  of	  Regulatory	  Cost	  Estimates,	   19	   J.	  POL’Y	  ANALYSIS	  &	  MGMT.	  297	  (2000).	  35 See	  See	  OFFICE	  OF	  MGMT.	  &	  BUDGET,	  VALIDATING	  REGULATORY	  ANALYSIS:	  2005	  REPORT	  TO	   CONGRESS	   ON	   THE	   COSTS	   AND	   BENEFITS	   OF	   FEDERAL	   REGULATIONS	   AND	   UNFUNDED	  MANDATES	   ON	   STATE,	   LOCAL,	   AND	   TRIBAL	   ENTITIES	   41-­‐46	   (2005),	   available	   at	  http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/final_2005_cb_report.pdf	   (collecting	   studies	   comparing	   ex	   ante	   and	   ex	   post	  analyses	   of	   regulations’	   costs	   and	   benefits,	   including	   examples	   where	   cost	   and	  benefit	  estimates	  were	  off	  by	  more	  than	  a	  factor	  of	  ten).	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important	  to	  know.	  But	  it	   is	  even	  more	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  we	  need	  to	  know	  a	  great	  deal	  more	  than	  we	  now	  do.	  The	  existing	  studies	  cover	  only	  a	  trivially	  small	  fraction	  of	  rules	  on	  the	  books.	  Much	  more	  can	  and	  should	  be	  done	  to	  compare	  prospective	  estimates	  to	  what	  actually	  happens	  in	  the	  world.	  	  	  
B.	  Retrospective	  Analysis,	  With	  Public	  Comment	  	  	   In	   2011,	   President	   Obama	   issued	   Executive	   Order	   13,563,	   which	   requires	  retrospective	   analysis	   of	   existing	   rules.	   A	   key	   goal	   is	   to	   reduce	   the	   knowledge	  problem,	   not	   by	   assembling	   information	   in	   advance,	   but	   by	   bringing	   to	   bear	  information	  about	  how	  rules	  are	  actually	  operating,	   and	  with	  explicit	   reference	   to	  the	  dispersed	  information	  of	  the	  public.	  	  	   After	  the	  order	  was	  issued,	  the	  initial	  step	  was	  the	  production	  of	  preliminary	  plans	   for	  retrospective	  review,	  which	  were	  required	  within	  120	  days.	  This	  was	  an	  aggressive	   timeline,	   especially	   considering	   the	   fact	   that	   public	   officials	   have	  numerous	  responsibilities.	  Many	  agencies	  began	  by	  asking	  for	  suggestions	  from	  the	  public,	   requesting	   ideas	   about	  which	   regulations	  must	  needed	   to	  be	   revisited.	   For	  example,	  the	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  and	  the	  Departments	  of	  Commerce,	  Transportation,	   Interior,	  Homeland	  Security,	  State,	  and	  Treasury	  posted	  notices	   in	  the	  Federal	  Register,	  asking	  for	  comments	  about	  how	  the	  process	  should	  work	  and	  which	   rules	   should	   be	   streamlined	   or	   repealed.	   Several	   agencies	   held	   public	  meetings	  nationwide.	  	  	   A	  small	  subset	  of	  these	  initiatives,	  finalized	  or	  formally	  proposed	  to	  the	  public,	  is	  producing	  savings	  of	  more	  than	  $10	  billion	  in	  a	  short	  period.	  Many	  of	  the	  resulting	  initiatives	  also	  provide	  benefits	  that	  are	  hard	  to	  monetize	  but	  likely	  to	  be	  significant.	  For	   example,	   it	   is	   not	   easy	   to	   quantify	   the	   economic	   benefits,	   including	   the	   jobs	  created,	   of	   reducing	   restrictions	   on	   exports	   and	   simplifying	   the	   requirements	  imposed	   on	   those	   who	   do	   business	   across	   national	   borders.	   Nonetheless,	   those	  benefits	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  high.	  
	  	   In	  2012,	  President	  Obama	  issued	  a	  supplemental	  Executive	  Order	  with	  three	  key	   components.36	  First,	   agencies	   are	   required	   to	   reach	   out	   to	   the	   public,	   on	   a	  continuing	  basis,	  to	  solicit	  ideas	  about	  reforms.	  Second,	  agencies	  must	  give	  priority	  to	  reforms	  that	  would	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  –	  for	  example,	  those	  with	  substantial	  economic	  savings.	  New	  initiatives	  should	  make	  a	  real	  difference;	  they	  should	  not	  be	  symbolic	  measures	  or	  mere	  updating.	  Third,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  important,	  agencies	  have	   to	   report	   on	   their	   progress	   to	  OIRA	   and	   to	   the	  public	   on	   a	   continuing	  basis.	  This	  final	  step	  is	  designed	  to	  promote	  accountability	  –	  to	  ensure	  that	  if	  agencies	  are	  not	  doing	  much,	  the	  public	  will	  be	  able	  to	  see	  that	  and	  provide	  a	  corrective.	  In	  all	  of	  these	  ways,	  the	  process	  of	  retrospective	  analysis	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  informed	  by	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36 Exec.	  Order	  No.	  13,610,	  3	  C.F.R.	  258	  (2012),	  reprinted	  in	  5	  U.S.C.	  §	  601	  at	  820-­‐21	  (2012).	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dispersed	  information	  of	  the	  public.	  	  
VI.	  Experiments	  	  	   	   To	   get	   the	   facts	   right,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   engage	   in	   far	  more	   evaluation	   and	  experimentation.	   The	   central	   goal	   is	   not	   to	   rely	   even	   on	   expert	   judgments	   about	  likely	   effects,	   but	   instead	   to	   compile	   evidence	   from	   the	   real	   world.37	  In	   the	   past	  decade,	  there	  has	  been	  growing	  interest	  in	  the	  use	  of	  randomized	  controlled	  trials	  as	  a	   means	   of	   learning	   the	   effects	   of	   policy	   initiatives.38	  In	  medicine,	   of	   course,	   it	   is	  standard	   to	   rely	   on	   such	   trials	   to	   see	   if	   a	   drug	   is	   safe	   and	   effective.	   For	   drugs,	   it	  would	  not	  make	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  sense	  simply	  to	  guess,	  to	  rely	  on	  informed	  hunches,	  or	  even	  to	  make	  simple	  “before	  and	  after”	  assessments.	  Suppose	  that	  we	  learn	  that	  people	  who	  use	  a	  certain	  asthma	  medicine	  do	  better	  after	  taking	  the	  medicine	  than	  before.	   If	   so,	  we	  know	  something	   important—but	  we	  do	  not	  know	  nearly	  enough.	  The	   risk	   with	   before-­‐and-­‐after	   assessments	   is	   that	   they	   may	   not	   control	   for	  confounding	  variables.	  Perhaps	  people	  are	  doing	  better	  because	  of	  some	  change	  in	  the	   environment	   that	   is	   not	   adequately	   understood	   by	   those	  who	   are	  making	   the	  assessment.	  In	  the	  medical	  domain,	  the	  value	  of	  randomized	  controlled	  experiments	  is	   that	   they	  have	   the	  potential	   to	  provide	  a	   clear	   sense	  of	   the	  actual	   effects	  of	   the	  intervention.	  	  	  	   Esther	  Duflo,	   along	  with	  many	  others,	   has	  pioneered	   the	  use	  of	   randomized	  controlled	  trials	  for	  purposes	  of	  policy	  evaluation.39	  In	  principle,	  such	  trials	  are	  the	  best	  way	  to	  solve	  the	  knowledge	  problem;	  they	  provide	  the	  closest	  thing	  to	  the	  gold	  standard,	   and	   in	   at	   least	   in	   some	   context,	   they	   should	   adequately	   respond	   to	   the	  Hayekian	  concern.40	  Duflo	  has	  shown	  that	   in	  many	  cases,	  small	  measures	  can	  have	  significant	   effects.	   In	   the	   regulatory	   area,	   the	   use	   of	   such	   trials	   remains	   in	   a	  preliminary	  state.41	  Analysis	  of	  costs	  and	  benefits	  is	  rarely	  informed	  by	  them.	  But	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  imagine	  serious	  evaluations.42	  Consider	  a	  few	  examples:	  	  	   -­‐-­‐	  Would	  state	  regulators	  save	  lives	  by	  banning	  the	  use	  of	  cell	  phones	  while	  driving?	  This	  is	  a	  disputed	  question.	  Laboratory	  experiments,	  showing	  that	  people’s	  reaction	  times	  slow	  down	  when	  they	  are	  distracted,	  strongly	  suggest	  that	  the	  answer	  is	  affirmative,	  and	  indeed	  that	  driving	  while	  talking	  on	  a	  phone	  is	  not	  unlike	   driving	   while	   inebriated,	   producing	   a	   fourfold	   increase	   in	   relative	   crash	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  See	  Dominici	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note.	  38	  See	  note	  supra.	  39	  See	  generally	  ABHIJIT	  BANERJEE	  &	  ESTHER	  DUFLO,	  POOR	  ECONOMICS	  (2011).	  40	  See	  Dominici	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note.	  For	  skeptical	  remarks,	  see	  Deaton,	  supra	  note.	  41	  For	  valuable	  discussion,	  see	  Michael	  Abramowicz,	  Predictocracy	  (2008);	  Michael	  Abramwicz	  et	  al.,	  Randomizing	  Law	  (2010),	  available	  at	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1672057	  42	  See	  Abramowicz,	  supra	  note.	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risk.43	  But	  perhaps	   those	  experiments	   are	   an	  unreliable	   guide	   to	   the	   real	  world.	  We	  could	  test	  whether	  a	  ban	  on	  cell	  phone	  use	  would	  have	  major	  effects	  on	  safety	  by	  comparing	  similarly	  situated	   localities,	  one	  with	  such	  a	  ban	  and	  one	  without.	  Or	  we	   could	   test	  whether	  accidents	   increase	   in	  periods	   in	  which	   cell	  phone	  use	  goes	   up	   –	   for	   example,	   when	   rates	   decrease	   after	   9	   p.m.	   (In	   fact	   precisely	   that	  question	  has	  been	  studied,	  with	  a	  surprising	  finding	  of	  no	  such	  increase.44)	  	  	   -­‐-­‐	  What	  are	  the	  effects	  of	  different	  methods	  of	  increasing	  rear	  visibility	  in	  cars?	  If	  cameras	  are	  placed	  in	  the	  dashboard,	  do	  accidents	  drop?	  How	  much,	  and	  compared	   to	  what?	   Do	   improved	  mirrors	   have	   a	   significant	   effect?	  What	   about	  sonar	   devices,	   making	   beeping	   noises?	   Do	   they	   work	   as	   well	   as	   cameras?	  Randomized	  trials	  might	  help	  (assuming	  that	  sufficiently	  large	  sample	  sizes	  could	  be	  obtained).	  	  	   -­‐-­‐	  It	  is	  important	  to	  evaluate	  different	  disclosure	  requirements.45	  We	  might	  test	  whether	  different	  fuel	  economy	  labels	  have	  different	  effects	  on	  similarly	  situated	  consumers.	  Does	  one	  label	  produce	  different	  choices?	  How	  different?	  If	  labels	  draw	  attention	  to	  annual	  fuel	  costs,	  are	  people	  affected?	  Do	  people	  care	  about	  environmental	  factors?	  How	  much?	  The	  same	  kinds	  of	  questions	  might	  be	  asked	  about	  disclosure	  requirements	  for	  credit	  cards,	  mortgages,	  cell	  phones,	  and	  school	  loans.	  	  	   	   In	  important	  areas,	  experimentation	  might	  take	  the	  form	  of	  advance	  testing	  of	  regulatory	  alternatives	  through	  randomized	  controlled	  trials.	  A	  movement	  in	  this	  direction	   would	   have	   major	   advantages	   over	   current	   approaches,	   such	   as	   focus	  groups,	  which	  are	  often	  highly	  artificial	  and	  which	  sometimes	  test	  what	  people	  like	  rather	  than	  what	  they	  would	  actually	  do.	  A	  presentation	  might	  be	  pleasing	  without	  having	  much	  of	  an	  effect	  on	  what	  people	  understand	  and	  do.	  	  	   In	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   there	   has	   been	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   interest	   in	   using	  randomized	  controlled	  trials,	  above	  all	  through	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Behavioral	  Insights	  Team	   (sometimes	   called	   the	   Nudge	   Unit).46	  Related	   efforts	   are	   being	  made	   in	   the	  United	  States	  and	  elsewhere.	  If	  randomized	  trials	  are	  not	  feasible,	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	   design	   experiments	   that	   replicate	   actual	   behavior	   by	   asking	   people	   concrete	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  CHARLOTTE	  L.	  BRACE	  ET	  AL.,	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  THE	  LITERATURE:	  THE	  USE	  OF	  MOBILE	  PHONES	  WHILE	  DRIVING	  (2007),	  available	  at	  http://www.nsc.org/news_resources/Resources/Documents/Analysis%20of%20the%20Literature,	  %20The%20Use%20of%20Mobile%20Phones%20While%20Driving.pdf.	  44	  Saurabh	  Bhargava	  &	  Vikram	  Pathania,	  Driving	  Under	  the	  (Cellular)	  Influence:	  The	  Link	  Between	  Cell	  Phone	  Use	  and	  Vehicle	  Crashes	  5	  AM.	  ECON.	  J.:	  ECON.	  POLICY	  92,	  available	  at	  http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/pol.5.3.92.	  45	  See	  George	  Lowenstein	  et	  al.,	  Disclosure:	  Psychology	  Changes	  Everything,	  6	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Economics	  391	  (2014).	  46	  https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/behavioural-­‐insights-­‐team	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questions	  about	  what	  they	  would	  do	  if	  provided	  with	  certain	  information	  or	  if	  given	  a	  range	  of	  options.	  	  Of	  course	  there	  are	  constraints—involving	  not	  merely	  law	  but	  also	  resources	  and	  feasibility	   (and	   perhaps	   equity	   as	  well)—in	   using	   randomized	   controlled	   trials	   in	  the	  regulatory	  context.	  Among	  other	  things,	  sufficient	  sample	  sizes	  might	  be	  difficult	  to	   obtain.	   But	   in	   some	   cases,	   they	   would	   be	   both	   appropriate	   and	   useful.	   The	  agencies’	  retrospective	  review	  plans	  show	  an	  unambiguous	  commitment	  to	  moving	  in	   this	   direction.	   The	  Department	   of	   Treasury	   states	   that	   it	  will	  work	   to	   “develop	  and	   incorporate	   experimental	   designs	   into	   retrospective	   analysis,	   when	  appropriate.”47	  The	   Department	   of	   Labor	   states	   that	   it	   “is	   contemplating	   how	   to	  incorporate	   the	   use	   of	   experimental	   designs	   to	   determine	   the	   impact	   of	   various	  regulations.”48	  The	   Department	   of	   Interior	   states	   that	   it	   will	   consider	   the	   use	   of	  “experimental	   or	   quasi-­‐experimental	   designs,	   including	   randomized	   controlled	  trials.”49	  We	  should	  expect	  far	  more	  progress	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  There	  can	  be	  a	  serious	  tension	  between	  the	  commitment	  to	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  and	  a	  realistic	  appreciation	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  official	  knowledge.	  Without	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  DEP’T	  OF	  THE	  TREASURY,	  PLAN	  FOR	  RETROSPECTIVE	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  EXISTING	  
RULES	  20	  (2011),	  available	  at	  http://www.treasury.gov/about/budget-­‐performance/annual-­‐performanceplan/	  Documents/lookback%20plan%20final%208%2018%2011%20clean.pdf.	  48	  U.S.	  DEP’T	  OF	  LABOR,	  PRELIMINARY	  PLAN	  FOR	  RETROSPECTIVE	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  
EXISTING	  
RULES	  22	  (2011),	  available	  at	  http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/2011-­‐regulatoryaction-­‐	  plans/DepartmentofLaborPreliminaryRegulatoryReformPlan.pdf.	  49	  DEP’T	  OF	  THE	  INTERIOR,	  PRELIMINARY	  PLAN	  FOR	  RETROSPECTIVE	  
REGULATORY	  REVIEW	  19,	  available	  at	  http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/2011-­‐regulatory-­‐actionplans/	  DepartmentoftheInteriorPreliminaryRegulatoryReformPlan.pdf.	  See	  also	  U.S.	  DEP’T	  OF	  
AGRICULTURE,	  FINAL	  PLAN	  FOR	  RETROSPECTIVE	  ANALYSIS	  PURSUANT	  TO	  
EXECUTIVE	  ORDER	  13563,	  at	  23	  (2011),	  available	  at	  http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/other/2011-­‐	  regulatory-­‐action	  plans/departmentofagricultureregulatoryreformplanaugust2011.pdf	  (“[The	  USDA]	  may	  consider	  the	  use	  of	  experimental	  or	  quasi-­‐experimental	  designs,	  including	  randomized	  controlled	  trials,	  when	  promoting	  the	  empirical	  testing	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  rules.”).	  
	   17	  
significant	  efforts	  to	  reduce	  those	  limits,	  such	  analysis	  might	  be	  inadequately	  informed.	  Whenever	  regulators	  face	  significant	  informational	  deficits,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  explore	  tools	  that	  take	  advantage	  of	  what	  the	  private	  sector	  knows;	  market-­‐friendly	  tools,	  such	  as	  economic	  incentives,	  have	  important	  advantages	  on	  that	  count.	  In	  some	  cases,	  regulators	  might	  appropriately	  decide	  to	  abstain	  entirely	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  the	  market	  failure	  is	  not	  clear	  and	  any	  cure	  might	  be	  worse	  than	  the	  disease.	  	  In	  other	  cases,	  however,	  Congress	  has	  required	  agencies	  to	  act,	  or	  the	  argument	  for	  action	  is	  too	  powerful	  to	  be	  ignored.	  In	  such	  cases,	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  is	  often	  indispensable.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  modern	  technologies,	  the	  old	  tool	  of	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  rulemaking	  has	  new	  promise	  in	  acquiring	  dispersed	  information.	  This	  point	  holds	  not	  only	  for	  new	  rules,	  which	  lack	  a	  track	  record,	  but	  also	  for	  retrospective	  analysis	  of	  old	  rules,	  for	  which	  the	  private	  sector	  often	  has	  important	  information	  about	  both	  costs	  and	  benefits.	  It	  would	  be	  extravagant	  to	  contend	  that	  notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  rulemaking	  can	  eliminate	  the	  knowledge	  problem,	  even	  in	  the	  modern	  era,	  but	  it	  can	  produce	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  help.	  When	  combined	  with	  retrospective	  analysis	  of	  regulations	  –	  itself	  spurred	  and	  informed	  by	  public	  comment	  –-­‐	  and	  with	  experimental	  evidence,	  it	  might	  well	  be	  possible	  to	  reduce	  the	  enduring	  tension	  between	  two	  ideas	  that	  belong	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  contemporary	  thinking	  about	  the	  administrative	  state.	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